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This paper examines how costly financial contracting and weak investor protection influence the cross-border
operational, financing and investment decisions of firms. We develop a model in which product developers
have a comparative advantage in monitoring the deployment of their technology abroad. The paper
demonstrates that when firms want to exploit technologies abroad, multinational firm (MNC) activity
and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows arise endogenously when monitoring is nonverifiable and
financial frictions exist. The mechanism generating MNC activity is not the risk of technological expropriation
by local partners but the demands of external funders who require MNC participation to ensure value
maximization by local entrepreneurs. The model demonstrates that weak investor protections limit
the scale of multinational firm activity, increase the reliance on FDI flows and alter the decision to
deploy technology through FDI as opposed to arm's length licensing. Several distinctive predictions
























Firms globalizing their operations and the associated capital ﬂows have become major
features of the world economy. These cross-border activities and capital ﬂows span insti-
tutional settings with varying investor protections and levels of capital market develop-
ment. While the importance of institutional heterogeneity in dictating economic outcomes
has been emphasized, existing analyses typically ignore the global ﬁr m sa n dt h ec a p i t a l
ﬂows that are now commonplace. Investigating how global ﬁrms make operational and
ﬁnancing decisions in a world of heterogenous institutions promises to provide a novel
perspective on observed patterns of ﬂows and ﬁrm activity.
This paper develops and tests a model of the operational and ﬁnancial decisions of
ﬁrms as they exploit their technologies in countries with diﬀering levels of investor pro-
tections. The model demonstrates that multinational ﬁrm (MNC) activity and foreign
direct investment (FDI) arise endogenously in settings characterized by ﬁnancial frictions.
Furthermore, the model generates several predictions regarding the use of arm’s length
licensing to transfer technology, the degree to which multinational ﬁrm activity is ﬁnanced
by capital ﬂows, the extent to which multinationals take ownership in foreign projects,
and the scale of operations abroad. These predictions are tested using ﬁrm-level data on
U.S. multinational ﬁrms.
The model considers the problem of a ﬁrm (which we interpret as the parent ﬁrm
of a multinational corporation) seeking to deploy a proprietary technology abroad with
the help of a local (or host-country) entrepreneur. The central premise of the model
is that the parent ﬁrm, as developer of the technology, has a comparative advantage in
monitoring how its technology is exploited and can uniquely identify if local entrepreneurs
are pursuing value maximization. A set of external investors are attractive sources of
ﬁnance for the exploitation of the technology abroad because they face a lower opportunity
cost of capital than that faced by the entrepreneur and the parent ﬁrm. In order to
convince external funders to supply capital, entrepreneurs need to give ﬁnancial claims
on the project to parent ﬁrms to ensure that they provide monitoring when monitoring is
unveriﬁable, thus mitigating managerial misbehavior by entrepreneurs. The concern over
managerial misbehavior, and the requirement for parent ﬁrm ﬁnancial participation, is
particularly acute when investor protections are weak.
The characterization of multinational ﬁrms as developers of technologies has long
been central to models explaining multinational ﬁrm activity. In contrast to those models
that emphasize the risk of technology expropriation, the model in this paper emphasizes
ﬁnancial frictions, a cruder form of managerial opportunism and the role of external
1funders. As such, while technology is central to these other models and the model in
this paper, the mechanism generating multinational ﬁrm activity is entirely distinct. Our
emphasis on monitoring builds on the theory presented in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)
which captures how monitoring is critical to understanding ﬁnancial intermediation.
In deriving our theoretical results, we ﬁnd it useful to ﬁrst develop a benchmark in
which monitoring is veriﬁable. In this setting, we show that when the developer of a
technology wants to deploy that technology abroad, the developer chooses to license this
technology to a host country entrepreneur who obtains ﬁnancing from external investors.
Under these circumstances, the entrepreneur can exploit technology without giving a ﬁ-
nancial claim on the project to the developer, who simply obtains a ﬂat fee for the use
of its proprietary technology. Nevertheless, when monitoring is veriﬁable, weak investor
protections still limit the scale of projects because these environments require more mon-
itoring and this inﬂates the marginal cost of production.
When monitoring is nonveriﬁable, capital ﬂows and multinational ownership of assets
abroad arise endogenously to align the incentives of the inventors of technology and the
entrepreneurs in host economies. In this setting, we show that an optimal contract calls
for the developer of the technology to own equity in the project and may also call for
the parent ﬁrm to provide funds for investment, even though external investors are more
eﬃcient sources of ﬁnancing.1
T h ec a s eo fn o n v e r i ﬁable monitoring delivers several novel predictions about the na-
ture of FDI and patterns of multinational ﬁrm activity. First, the model predicts that
technology will be exploited through unrelated party licensing rather than through aﬃl-
iate activity in countries where investor protections are stronger. Second, the share of
activity abroad ﬁnanced by capital ﬂows from the multinational parent will be decreas-
ing in the quality of investor protections in host economies. Third, ownership shares by
multinational parents will also be decreasing in the quality of investor protections in host
economies. These predictions reﬂect the fact that monitoring by the developer of the
technology is more critical in settings where investor protections are weaker. The model
also predicts that the scale of activity based on multinational technologies in host coun-
tries will be an increasing function of the quality of the institutional environment. Better
investor protections reduce the need for monitoring and therefore allow for a larger scale
of activity.
We test these predictions using the most comprehensive available data on the activities
1Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), in our model contracting is “complete” in the sense that
we solve for the optimal contract subject to explicit information frictions. This is in contrast to a large
incomplete-contracting literature in corporate ﬁnance.
2of U.S. multinational ﬁrms. These data provide details on the world wide operations of
U.S. multinationals and include measures of parental ownership, ﬁnancing and operational
decisions. These data enable the use of parent-year ﬁxed eﬀects that implicitly control
for a variety of unobserved attributes.
The analysis indicates that the likelihood of using arm’s length licensing to serve a
foreign market increases with measures of investor protections, as suggested by the model.
The predictions on parent ﬁnancing and ownership decisions are also conﬁrmed to be a
function of the quality of investor protections and the depth of capital markets. The model
also suggests that these eﬀects should be most pronounced for technologically advanced
ﬁrms because these ﬁrms are most likely to be able to provide valuable monitoring services.
The empirical evidence indicates a diﬀerential eﬀect for such ﬁrms.
Settings where ownership restrictions are liberalized provide an opportunity to test
the ﬁnal prediction of the model. The model implies that these liberalizations should
have a particularly large eﬀect on multinational aﬃliate activity in countries with weak
investor protections because, in those countries, ownership restrictions limit multinational
ﬁrm activity the most. Our empirical analysis conﬁrms that aﬃliate activity increase by
larger amounts after liberalizations in countries with weaker investor protections.
This paper extends the large and growing literature on the eﬀects of investor protec-
tion and capital market development on economic outcomes to an open economy setting
where ﬁrms make operational and ﬁnancial decisions across borders. La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) relate investor protections to the concentration
of ownership and the depth of capital markets. A large literature, including King and
Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998) Rajan and Zingales (1998), Wurgler (2000),
and Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2005), has shown that ﬁnancial market conditions
inﬂuence ﬁrm investment behavior, economic growth and industrial structure.
By exclusively emphasizing ﬁrms with local investment and ﬁnancing, this literature
has neglected how cross-border, intraﬁrm activity responds to institutional variations.
The open economy dimensions of institutional variations have been explored, but only in
the context of arms-length cross-border lending as in Gertler and Rogoﬀ (1990), Boyd and
Smith (1997) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002).2 The model in this paper demonstrates
how both multinational activity and capital ﬂows respond to heterogeneity in institu-
2Gertler and Rogoﬀ (1990) show how arms-length lending to entrepreneurs in poor countries is limited
by their inability to pledge large amounts of their own wealth. This insight is embedded into a multi-
national ﬁrm’s production decisions in the model presented here. Our setup also relates to Shleifer and
Wolfenzon (2002), who study the interplay between investor protection and equity markets. In contrast,
Kraay et al. (2005) emphasize the role of sovereign risk in shaping the structure of world capital ﬂows.
3tional settings. In short, we show that weak ﬁnancial institutions decrease the scale of
multinational ﬁrm activity but simultaneously increase the reliance on capital ﬂows from
the parent. As such, observed patterns of capital ﬂows reﬂect these two distinct and
contradictory eﬀects. The empirical investigations of micro-data provided in the paper
indicate that both eﬀects are operative.
By jointly considering the determinants of MNC activities and the ﬂows of capital
that support these activities, the paper also links two literatures—the international trade
literature on multinationals and the macroeconomic literature on capital ﬂows. Industrial
organization and international trade scholarsc h a r a c t e r i z em u l t i n a t i o n a l sa sh a v i n gp r o -
prietary assets and emphasize the role of market imperfections, such as transport costs
and market power, in determining patterns of multinational activity. Recent work on
multinational ﬁrms investigates “horizontal” or “vertical” motivations3 for foreign direct
investment and explores why alternative productive arrangements, such as whole owner-
ship of foreign aﬃliates, joint ventures, exports or arm’s length contracts, are employed.4
Such analyses of multinational ﬁrm activity typically do not consider associated capital
ﬂows.5 Research on capital ﬂows typically abstracts from ﬁrm activity and has focused
on the paradox posed by Lucas (1990) of limited capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries
in the face of large presumed rate of return diﬀerentials. While Lucas (1990) emphasizes
human-capital externalities to help explain this paradox, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004)
review subsequent research on aggregate capital ﬂows and conclude that credit market
3The horizontal FDI view represents FDI as the replication of capacity in multiple locations in response
to factors such as trade costs, as in Markusen (1984), Brainard (1997), Markusen and Venables (2000), and
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). The vertical FDI view represents FDI as the geographic distribution
of production globally in response to the opportunities aﬀorded by diﬀerent markets, as in Helpman
(1984) and Yeaple (2003). Caves (1996) and Markusen (2002) provide particularly useful overviews of
this literature.
4Antràs (2003, 2005), Antràs and Helpman (2004), Desai, Foley and Hines (2004), Ethier and
Markusen (1996), Feenstra and Hanson (2005), and Grossman and Helpman (2004) analyze the de-
terminants of alternative foreign production arrangements.
5Several studies linking levels of MNC activity and FDI ﬂows are worth noting. First, high frequency
changes in FDI capital ﬂows have been linked to relative wealth levels through real exchange rate move-
ments (as in Froot and Stein (1991) and Blonigen (1997)), broader measures of stock market wealth
(as in Klein and Rosengren (1994) and Baker, Foley and Wurgler (2006)) and to credit market condi-
tions (as in Klein, Peek and Rosengren (2002)). Second, multinational ﬁrms have also been shown to
opportunistically employ internal capital markets in weak institutional environments (as in Desai, Fo-
ley and Hines (2004b)) and during currency crises (as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) and Desai, Foley
and Forbes (forthcoming)). These papers emphasize how heterogeneity in access to capital can interact
with multinational ﬁrm production decisions. Marin and Schnitzer (2004) also study the ﬁnancing deci-
sions of multinational ﬁrms in a model that stresses managerial incentives. Their model however takes
the existence of multinational ﬁrms as given and considers an incomplete-contracting setup in contrast
to our complete-contracting setup. The predictions from their model are quite distinct (and typically
contradictory) to the ones we develop here and show to be supported by U.S. data.
4conditions and political risk play signiﬁcant roles. By examining ﬁrm behavior in a setting
of heterogenous institutional setting, this paper attempts to unify an investigation of
multinational ﬁrm activity and FDI ﬂows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model, discusses
the case of fully veriﬁable monitoring, extends the model to settings of nonveriﬁable
monitoring and then generates several predictions related to the model. Section 3 provides
details on the data employed in the analysis. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical
analysis and Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We begin this section by describing a partial equilibrium model of ﬁnancing that builds on
and extends the work of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).6 We later illustrate how the model
is able to generate both multinational activity as well as foreign direct investment ﬂows.
Finally, we explore some ﬁrm-level empirical predictions that emerge from the model.
2.1 A Model of Financial Contracting
Environment
We consider the problem of an agent — an inventor — who is endowed with an amount
W of ﬁnancial wealth and the technology or knowledge to produce a diﬀerentiated good.
Consumers in two countries, Home and Foreign, derive utility from consuming this diﬀer-
entiated good.7 The good, however, is prohibitively costly to trade and thus servicing a
particular market requires setting up a production facility in that country. The inventor
is located at Home and cannot fully control production in Foreign. Servicing that market
thus requires contracting with a foreign agent — an entrepreneur — to manage produc-
tion there. We assume that entrepreneurs are endowed with no ﬁnancial wealth and their
outside option is normalized to 0. There also exists a continuum of inﬁnitessimal external
investors in Foreign that have access to a technology that gives them a gross rate of
return equal to 1 on their wealth. All parties are risk neutral and are protected by limited
liability. There are three periods, a date 0 contracting stage, a date 1 investment stage,
and a date 2 production/consumption stage.
6Our model generalizes the setup in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) by allowing for diminishing returns
to investment and for variable monitoring levels. The scope of the two papers is also very distinct: they
studied the monitoring role of banks in a closed-economy model, while our focus is on multinational ﬁrms.
7In the Appendix, we develop a multi-country version of the model.
5Consumer Preferences and Technology
In the main text, we focus on describing production and ﬁnancing decisions in the Foreign
market. For that purpose, we assume that preferences and technology at Home are such
that at date 2 the inventor obtains a constant gross return β>1 for each unit of wealth
h ei n v e s t si np r o d u c t i o na tH o m ea td a t e1 .W er e f e rt ot h i sg r o s sr e t u r na st h ei n v e n t o r ’ s
shadow value of cash. In the Appendix, the value of β is endogenously derived in a
multi-country version of the model where consumer preferences, technology and ﬁnancial
contracting in all countries are fully speciﬁed.
We assume that Foreign preferences are such that cash ﬂows or proﬁts obtained from
t h es a l eo ft h ed i ﬀerentiated good in Foreign can be expressed as a strictly increasing and
concave function of the quantity produced, i.e, R(q),w i t hR0 (q) > 0 and R00 (q) ≤ 0.W e
also assume the standard conditions R(0) = 0, limq→0 R0 (q)=+ ∞,a n dlimq→∞ R0 (q)=
0. These properties of R(q) can be derived from preferences featuring a constant (and
higher-than-one) elasticity of substitution across (a continuum of) diﬀerentiated goods
produced by diﬀerent ﬁrms. In such case, the elasticity of R(q) with respect to q is
constant and given by a parameter α ∈ (0,1).
Foreign production is managed by the foreign entrepreneur, who at date 1 can privately
choose to behave and enjoy no private beneﬁts, or misbehave and take private beneﬁts.
When the manager behaves, the project performs with probability pH, in the sense that
when an amount x is invested at date 1, project cash ﬂo w sa td a t e2a r ee q u a lt oR(x) with
probability pH and 0 otherwise.8 When the manager misbehaves, the project performs
with a lower probability pL <p H and expected cash ﬂows are pLR(x). We assume that
the private beneﬁt a manager obtains from misbehaving is proportional to the return of
the project, i.e., BR(x).
Managerial misbehavior and the associated private beneﬁts can be manifest by choos-
ing to implement the project in a way that generates perquisites for the manager or his
associates, in a way that requires less eﬀort, or in a way that is more fun or glamorous.
As described below, we will relate the ability to engage in such private beneﬁts to the
level of investor protections in Foreign as well as to the extent to which the entrepreneur
is monitored. The idea is that countries with better investor protections tend to enforce
laws that limit the ability of managers to divert funds from the ﬁrm or to enjoy private
beneﬁts or perquisites. This interpretation parallels the logic in Tirole (2006, p. 359).
When investor protections are not perfectly secure, monitoring by third agents is
8This assumes that, when the project succeeds, each unit invested results in a unit of output (q = x),
while when the project fails, output is zero (q =0 ).
6helpful in reducing the extent to which managers are able to divert funds or enjoy private
beneﬁts. Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we introduce a monitoring technol-
ogy that reduces the private beneﬁt of the foreign entrepreneur when he misbehaves. It is
reasonable to assume that the inventor has a comparative advantage in monitoring the be-
havior of the foreign entrepreneur because the inventor is particularly well informed about
how to manage the production of output using its technology. Intuitively, the developer
of a technology is particularly well situated to determine if project failure is assocated
with managerial actions or bad luck.9 We capture this in a stark way by assuming that
no other agent in the economy can productively monitor the foreign entrepreneur. On the
other hand, when the inventor incurs an eﬀort cost CR(x) in monitoring at date 1, the
private beneﬁt for the local entrepreneur is multiplied by a factor δ(C),w i t hδ
0 (C) < 0,
δ
00 (C) > 0, δ(0) = ¯ δ, limC→∞ δ (C)=0 , limC→0 δ
0 (C)=−∞,a n dlimC→∞ δ
0 (C)=0 .10
The scope of private beneﬁts is related to the level of investor protection of the host
c o u n t r yb ya ni n d e xγ ∈ (0,1). In particular, we specify that
B (C;γ)=( 1− γ)δ (C). (1)
Note that this formulation implies that ∂B(·)/∂γ < 0, ∂B(·)/∂C < 0,a n d∂2B (·)/∂C∂γ =
−δ
0 (C) > 0. This formulation captures the intuition that the scope for private beneﬁts
is decreasing in both investor protection and monitoring, and that monitoring has a rela-
tively larger eﬀect on private beneﬁts in countries with poor legal protection of investors.
Contracting
We consider optimal contracting between three sets of agents: the inventor, the foreign
entrepreneur and foreign external investors. At date 0, the inventor and the foreign
entrepreneur negotiate a contract that stipulates the terms under which the entrepreneur
will exploit the technology developed by the inventor. This contract includes a date-0
transfer P from the entrepreneur to the inventor, as well as the agents’ date-2 payoﬀs
9An alternative way to interpret monitoring is as follows. Suppose that the foreign entrepreneur can
produce the good under a variety (a continuum, actually) of potential techniques indexed by z ∈ [0,B].
Technique 0 entails a probability of success equal to pH and a zero private beneﬁt. All techniques with
z>0 are associated with a probability of success equal to pL and a private beneﬁte q u a lt oz. Clearly,
all techniques with z ∈ (0,B) are dominated from the point of view of the foreign entrepreneur, who
will thus eﬀectively (privately) choose either z =0or z = B, as assumed in the main text. Under this
interpretation, we can think of monitoring as simply making certain high-private beneﬁtp r o j e c t sn o t
available to the entrepreneur, i.e., reducing the upper bound of [0,B].
10These conditions are suﬃcient to ensure that the optimal contract is unique and satisﬁes the second-
order conditions.
7contingent on the return of the project.11 When P>0, the date-0 payment can be
thought of as the price or royalties paid for the use of the technology, which the inventor
can invest in the Home market at date 1. When P<0, we can think of the inventor as
coﬁnancing the project in the Foreign country. The contract between the inventor and
the entrepreneur also stipulates the date-1 scale of investment x, while the managerial
and monitoring eﬀorts of the entrepreneur and inventor, respectively, are unveriﬁable and
thus cannot be part of the contract. To build intuition, we consider in Section 2.2 the
case in which monitoring is veriﬁable.
Also at date 0, the foreign entrepreneur and external investors sign a ﬁnancial contract
under which the entrepreneur borrows an amount E from the external investors at date
0 in return for a date-2 payment contingent on the return of the project.
We consider an optimal contract from the point of view of the inventor and allow the
contract between the inventor and the entrepreneur to stipulate the terms of the ﬁnancial
contract between the entrepreneur and foreign external investors. We rule out “direct”
ﬁnancial contracts between the inventor and foreign external investors. This is justiﬁed
within the model in the Appendix.
Given the payoﬀ structure of our setup and our assumptions of risk neutrality and
limited liability, it is straightforward to show that an optimal contract is such that all
date-2 payoﬀs can be expressed as shares of the return generated by the project.12 When
an agent’s share of the date-2 return is positive, this agent thus becomes an equity holder
in the entrepreneur’s production facility.13 We deﬁne φI and φE as the equity shares
held by the inventor and external investors, respectively, with the remaining share 1 −
φI − φE accruing to the foreign entrepreneur. Notice that when φI is large enough, the
entrepreneur’s production facility becomes a subsidiary of the inventor’s ﬁrm.
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the main elements of the model.
11For simplicity, we assume that the inventor’s date-1 return in its Home market is not pleadgeable in
Foreign.
12More formally, in our setup the optimal contract is such that all agents obtain a payoﬀ equal to
zero when the project fails (that is when the return is zero), and a nonnegative payoﬀ when the project
succeeds (in which case cash ﬂows are positive).
13We focus on an interpretation of payoﬀs resembling the payoﬀs of an equity contract, but the model
is not rich enough to distinguish our optimal contract from a standard debt contract. Our results would
survive in a model in which agents randomized between using equity and debt contracts. In any case, we
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Figure 1: A Simple Picture of the Model
2.2 Optimal Financial Contract with Veriﬁable Monitoring
We ﬁrst consider the case in which monitoring is veriﬁable and thus can be speciﬁed in
the contract. An optimal contract that induces the entrepreneur to behave is given by
the tuple
n
˜ P,˜ φI, ˜ x, ˜ φE, ˜ E, ˜ C
o
that solves the following program:
max
P,φI,x,φE,E,C
ΠI = φIpHR(x)+( W + P)β − CR(x)
s.t. x ≤ E − P (i)
pHφER(x) ≥ E (ii)
pH (1 − φE − φI)R(x) ≥ 0 (iii)
(pH − pL)(1− φE − φI)R(x) ≥ (1 − γ)δ(C)R(x) (iv)
φI ≥ 0 (v)
(P1)
The objective function represents the payoﬀ of the inventor. The ﬁrst term represents
the inventor’s dividends from the expected cash ﬂows of the foreign production facility.
The second term represents the gross return from investing his wealth W plus the date-0
transfer P in the Home market. The last term represents the monitoring costs.
The ﬁrst constraint is a ﬁnancing constraint. Since the local entrepreneur has no
wealth, his ability to invest at date 1 is limited by whatever is left from the external in-
vestors’ ﬁnancing E after satisfying the payment P to the inventor. The second inequality
9is the participation constraint of external investors, who need to earn at least an expected
gross return on their investments equal to 1. Similarly, the third inequality is the partic-
ipation constraint of the foreign entrepreneur, given his zero outside option. The fourth
inequality is the foreign entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility constraint. This presumes
that it is in the interest of the inventor to design a contract in a way that induces the
foreign entrepreneur to behave.14 The ﬁnal inequality is a non-negativity constraint on
the share of equity held by the inventor.15
In the program above, constraint (iii) will never bind. Intuitively, as is standard in
incomplete information problems, the incentive compatibility constraint of the entrepre-
neur demands that this agent obtains some informational rents in equilibrium, and thus
his participation constraint is slack.
The other four constraints will bind in equilibrium. This is intuitive for the ﬁnancing
constraint (i), the participation constraint of investors (ii), and the incentive compatibility
constraint (iv). In addition, the fact that constraint (v) binds immediately implies that
the equilibrium equity share of the inventor satisﬁes
˜ φI =0 , (2)
and thus the overall payoﬀ of the inventor is not contingent on the outcome of the project.
The intuition for this result is that with veriﬁable monitoring, equity shares are not an
optimal mechanism for transferring utility from the entrepreneur to the inventor. It may
appear that a positive φI is attractive because it reduces the required lump-sum price for
the technology P and thus encourages investment. However, inspection of constraint (iii)
reveals that a larger φI decreases the ability of the entrepreneur to borrow from external
investors, as it reduces his pleadgeable income. Overall, one can show that whether utility
is transferred through an equity share or a date-0 lump-sum payment has no eﬀect on
the scale of the project. In addition, it is clear from the objective function that the
inventor strictly prefers a date-0 lump-sum transfer since he can use these funds to invest
domestically and obtain a gross rate of return β>1 on them. Hence, ˜ φI =0is optimal.
Manipulation of the ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem also delivers the unique










14Below we derive conditions under which this choice is optimal.
15We assume throughout that W is large enough to ensure that W + P ≥ 0 in equilibrium.
10Because δ
00 (·) > 0,w eﬁnd that monitoring ˜ C is relatively higher when the entre-
preneur resides in a country with a lower level of investor protection (low γ)o rw h e n
the inventor has a relatively high shadow value of cash (high β). Both cases correspond
to situations in which the entrepreneur is relatively more constrained, so the marginal
beneﬁt of monitoring is especially high in those cases.
With the equilibrium value for monitoring, the remaining values for the optimal con-
tract can easily be derived. In particular, straightforward manipulation of the ﬁrst order












Making use of equation (3) and the concavity of R(x), one can show (see Appendix) that
˜ x is necessarily increasing in γ, that is, output and cash ﬂows are higher in host countries
with better investor protections. In the limit in which γ → 1,w eﬁnd that ˜ C → 0 and
R0 (˜ x)=1 /pH, which corresponds to the ﬁrst-best level of investment. Similarly, we can
show that output and cash ﬂows are strictly increasing in β, the shadow value of cash of
the inventor. Intuitively, the larger is β, the larger is the incentive to use monitoring to
reduce ineﬃciencies and generate a larger P that can be invested in the domestic economy.
Using constraints (i), (ii), and (iii), one can obtain the equilibrium values of ˜ φE and
˜ E in terms of ˜ C and ˜ x :







˜ E = pH˜ φER(˜ x).( 6 )










˜ CR(˜ x) > 0,( 7 )
where the sign follows from R(˜ x)/˜ x>R 0 (˜ x) > 1 given the concavity of R(˜ x) and
R(0) = 0.
In sum, the optimal contract is such that the inventor does not take a positive stake
in the entrepreneurs’ production facility and simply receives a positive lump-sum fee for
the exploitation of the technology. Finally, we can compute the net payoﬀ of the inventor,
11which is given by
˜ ΠI = βW + β
µ
R(˜ x)




We summarize the main results in this section in the following proposition (see the
Appendix for a formal proof):
Proposition 1 (Veriﬁable Monitoring) There exist a unique tuple
n
˜ P,˜ φI, ˜ x, ˜ φE, ˜ E, ˜ C
o
that solves program (P1). Furthermore, an optimal contract that induces the entrepreneur
to behave is characterized by equations (2)-(7) and is such that:
1. The inventor does not take an equity stake in the local entrepreneur’s production
facility (˜ φI =0 ).
2. The inventor receives a positive lump-sum transfer ( ˜ P>0)f o rt h eu s eo ft h e
technology.
3. Output and cash ﬂows are increasing in investor protection in Foreign (γ)a n di n
the inventor’s shadow value of cash (β).
4. Monitoring is decreasing in γ and increasing in β.
Proof. See Appendix.
So far we have ignored the possibility that the inventor does not induce the entre-
preneur to behave. In the Appendix, we show that if the entrepreneur misbehaves, the
inventor would obtain a payoﬀ equal to
˜ Π
L


















It is thus clear that as long as ˜ x>˜ xL, the contract described in Proposition 1 is the
optimal contract. Given that when γ → 1, R0 (˜ x) → 1/pH < 1/pL = R0 ¡
˜ xL¢
, good
behavior is necessarily induced whenever γ is suﬃciently high.
122.3 Nonveriﬁable Monitoring and the Emergence of Foreign Di-
rect Investment
We next consider the case in which monitoring is not veriﬁable and thus cannot be speciﬁed
in the contract. Speciﬁcally, we consider the case in which, at date 1, the inventor privately





and decides whether to behave or misbehave. In this case, the
contract has to be such that the inventor ﬁnds it privately optimal to exert monitoring
eﬀort.
It is straightforward to see that the contract speciﬁed in the previous section does not
accomplish this. In particular, notice that whenever ˜ φI =0 , the payoﬀ of the inventor is
independent of the behavior of the entrepreneur, and thus the inventor will not have any
incentive to monitor the entrepreneur at date 1. Hence, given the contract in Proposition
1, the inventor would set ˘ C =0 , which would imply that the entrepreneur’s private
beneﬁt from misbehaving is limC→0 B (C)=( 1− γ)¯ δ, and for large enough ¯ δ, his incentive
compatibility is violated. In sum, as long as the inventor’s payoﬀ is not contingent on the
return of the investment, the inventor will not exert a positive monitoring eﬀort, and, for
large enough ¯ δ, the entrepreneur misbehaves.
We next show that the inventor may improve upon this outcome by modifying the
previous contract in a way that induces good behavior on the part of the entrepreneur.
This requires the inventor’s equity stake to be positive. It is still the case, however,
that the inventor has an incentive to set the minimum monitoring level ˘ C such that
the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility constraint is satisﬁed. This implies that this
monitoring cost is implicitly given by:





In order for this positive monitoring eﬀo r tt ob ec r e d i b l e ,t h ei n i t i a lc o n t r a c tn e e d st o
satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraint for the inventor:
φIpHR(x) − ˘ CR(x) ≥ φIpLR(x).
This condition corresponds to the intuition that the inventor’s payoﬀ should be higher
when exerting the positive monitoring level ˘ C than when not doing so.16
16Our derivation of this IC constraint assumes that if the inventor deviates from ˘ C,i td o e ss ob ys e t t i n g
C =0 , but this is without loss of generality because any other deviation C>0 is dominated.
13It follows from the above discussion that an optimal contract that induces the entre-
preneur to behave is now given by the tuple
n
ˆ P,ˆ φI, ˆ x, ˆ φE, ˆ E, ˆ C
o




ΠI = φIpHR(x)+( W + P)β − CR(x)
s.t. x ≤ E − P (i)
pHφER(x) ≥ E (ii)
pH (1 − φE − φI)R(x) ≥ 0 (iii)
(pH − pL)(1− φE − φI)R(x)=( 1− γ)δ(C)R(x) (iv)
(pH − pL)φIR(x) ≥ CR(x) (v’)
(P2)
This program is identical to (P1) except for the inclusion of the new incentive com-
patibility constraint (v’) for the inventor.17 We show in the Appendix that it is again
the case that, except for constraint (iii), the remaining constraints all bind in an optimal
contract. This immediately implies that the solution to (P2) entails the inventor taking a
positive equity stake in the project undertaken by the foreign entrepreneur. In particular,





which will be positive as long as ˆ C is positive. In addition, the level of monitoring is now
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and thus ˆ C<˜ C.I n
words, when monitoring is nonveriﬁable, it is underprovided. Next, working with the















¶.( 1 1 )
A si nt h ec a s ew i t hv e r i ﬁable monitoring, whenever γ → 1,w eh a v et h a t ˆ C → 0 and ˆ x is
17To be precise, it diﬀers also in the fact that the private choice of C ensures that (iv) will bind. This
is immaterial since that constraint was binding in program (P1) as well.
14set at the ﬁrst-best level implicitly deﬁned by R0 (ˆ x)=1 /pH.
The terms of the ﬁnancial contract with external investors are now given by:










ˆ E = pHˆ φER(ˆ x).( 1 3 )









β (pH − pL)
ˆ CR(ˆ x).( 1 4 )
Comparing this initial lump-sum transfer with the result of veriﬁable monitoring, we note
that, provided that α(x) ≡ R(x)/(R0 (x)x) is nondecreasing in x, it will necessarily be
t h ec a s et h a t ˆ P<˜ P, and the initial transfer is lower with nonveriﬁable monitoring. As
mentioned above, when preferences feature a constant elasticity of substitution across a
continuum of diﬀerentiated goods produced by diﬀerent ﬁrms, α(x) is in fact independent
of x,a n dR(x) can be written as R(x)=Axα,w h e r eA>0 and α ∈ (0,1).I ns u c hc a s e ,








β (pH − pL)
ˆ CA(ˆ x)
α .
Notice that the initial transfer payment is also not necessarily positive in this case. In
particular, given the concavity of R(x), if the optimal level of ˆ x is low enough, R(ˆ x)/ˆ x
will be large, and ˆ P will be negative.
To summarize, introducing the nonveriﬁability of monitoring transforms a transaction
that has the properties of a market transaction—the payment of a ﬂat fee for the use of
a technology— into something that has the properties of foreign direct investment. When
monitoring is nonveriﬁable, it is optimal for the inventor to take an equity stake in the
project and instead of charging a positive price for the use of the technology, the inventor
may now decide instead to coﬁnance the foreign operations by setting a negative ˆ P at
date 0. In sum, we have shown (see the Appendix for formal proofs) that:
Proposition 2 (Nonveriﬁable Monitoring) There exist a unique tuple
n
ˆ P,ˆ φI, ˆ x, ˆ φE, ˆ E, ˆ C
o
that solves program (P2). Furthermore, an optimal contract that induces the entrepreneur
to behave is characterized by equations (9)-(14) and is such that:
1. The inventor takes a positive equity stake in the local entrepreneur’s production
15facility (ˆ φI > 0).
2. Depending on parameter values, the entrepreneur may receive a positive lump-sum
transfer ( ˆ P>0)f o rt h eu s eo ft h et e c h n o l o g yo ri tm a yi n s t e a dc o ﬁnance the project
via an initial capital transfer ( ˆ P<0).
Proof. See Appendix.
Before moving to an analysis of the comparative statics, it is important to consider
the possibility that the inventor decides not to implement good behavior on the part of
the foreign entrepreneur. We show in the Appendix that this is never optimal provided
that ˆ x>˜ xL,w h e r e˜ xL is deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 8 ) .B e c a u s ea sγ → 1, R0 (ˆ x) → 1/pH,w e
can conclude again that inducing the foreign entrepreneur to behave is optimal whenever
γ is suﬃciently high.
2.4 Comparative Statics: Firm-Level Empirical Predictions
In order to guide the empirical analysis, we outline the predictions that the model gener-
ates concerning patterns of multinational ﬁrm activity and ﬁnancing ﬂows. This subsec-
tion highlights the eﬀects of investor protection γ in Foreign on: (i) the scale of activity;
(ii) the extent of inventor ownership; and (iii) the share of capital provided by the inven-
tor. We also describe the eﬀects of the shadow value of cash β on each of these. Because
our estimation employs parent-ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, we do not test these predictions about
β.
As is clear from equations (9), (11) and (14), in order to understand the eﬀects of γ and
β on the main observable components of the optimal contract, we ﬁr s th a v et oi n v e s t i g a t e
the eﬀect of these parameters on the optimal amount of monitoring. Straightforward
diﬀerentiation of equation (10) together with the convexity of the function δ(·) produces
the following result:
Lemma 1 The amount of monitoring ˆ C is decreasing in both investor protection γ in
Foreign and in the inventor’s shadow value of cash β.
Proof. See Appendix.
The eﬀect of investor protection on monitoring is similar to the eﬀect described in the
case of veriﬁable monitoring. Given our speciﬁcation of the private beneﬁtf u n c t i o nB (·)
in (1), the marginal beneﬁt from monitoring is larger the less developed is the ﬁnancial
16system in Foreign (the lower is γ). Since the marginal cost of monitoring is independent
of γ, in equilibrium C and γ are negatively correlated.
The eﬀect of the shadow value of cash β on monitoring is quite distinct from the
case with veriﬁable monitoring, where monitoring is increasing in β. The intuition for
this divergence is that the incentive compatibility constraint of the inventor becomes
tighter as the amount of monitoring in equilibrium increases. In particular, a higher level
of monitoring requires a larger equity share φI. This is costly because for β>1,t h e
inventor would like to receive a larger share of the the foreign entrepreneur’s payments
upfront. The larger is β, the higher is the shadow cost of monitoring working through the
incentive compatibility constraint, and the lower is the optimal amount of monitoring.
Our theory has implications for the share of equity held by the inventor that relate
closely to the implications for monitoring. From equation (9), it is obvious that the share
φI is proportional to the level of monitoring and thus is aﬀected by the parameters γ and
β i nt h es a m ew a ya si sm o n i t o r i n g .T h i sr e ﬂects that equity shares emerge in our model
as incentives for the inventor to monitor the foreign entrepreneur. As a result, we can
establish that:
Proposition 3 The share of equity held by the inventor is decreasing both in investor
protection γ in Foreign and in the inventor’s shadow value of cash β.
Proof. Proof in text.
An immediate corollary of this result is:
Corollary 1 Suppose that a transaction is recorded as an FDI transaction if ˆ φI ≥ φI
and as a licensing transaction if ˆ φI <φ I. Then, there exist a threshold investor protection
γ∗ ∈ [0,1] over which the optimal contract entails licensing and under which the optimal
contract entails FDI.
With these results at hand, diﬀerentiation of equation (11), which implicitly deﬁnes
the equilibrium level of ˆ x and R(ˆ x), yields the conclusion that:
Proposition 4 Output and cash ﬂows in Foreign are increasing in investor protection γ
in Foreign and decreasing in the inventor’s shadow value of cash β.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for the eﬀect of investor protection is straightforward. Despite the fact
that the inventor’s monitoring reduces ﬁnancial frictions, both the foreign entrepreneur’s
17compensation, as dictated by his incentive compatibility constraint (iv), and monitoring
costs are increasing in the scale of operation. In countries with weaker investor protections,
the perceived marginal cost of investment is higher, thus reducing equilibrium levels of
investment.
Finally, our model also generates predictions for the sources of ﬁnancing of the foreign
production facility. To see this, focus on the case in which the date-0 payment ˆ P is actually
negative and can be interpreted as the inventor coﬁnancing Foreign activity. Deﬁne the
amount of ﬁnancing provided by the inventor by F ≡− P. The share of investment















where α(ˆ x) ≡ R(ˆ x)/(R0 (ˆ x)ˆ x). Notice that this expression is increasing in ˆ C. Further-
more, provided that α(ˆ x) does not increase in ˆ x too quickly, the ratio ˆ F/ˆ x is decreasing
in ˆ x, due to the concavity of R(·). It thus follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition 4 that:
Proposition 5 Provided that α(ˆ x) does not increase in ˆ x too quickly, the share of in-
ventor ﬁnancing in total ﬁnancing ( ˆ F/ˆ x) is decreasing in investor protection γ.
Proof. Proof in text.
The intuition behind the result is that monitoring by inventors has a relatively high
marginal product in countries with weak ﬁnancial institutions. To induce the inventor
to monitor, the optimal contract speciﬁes a relatively steeper payment schedule, with a
relatively higher contribution by the inventor at date 0 (a higher ˆ F/ˆ x) in anticipation of
a higher share of the cash ﬂows generated by the project at date 2 (a higher φI).
The eﬀect of the shadow value of cash on the ratio ˆ F/ˆ x is ambiguous. A larger β is
associated with a lower monitoring level ˆ C (Lemma 1), but also with a lower level of ˆ x
and thus a higher ratio R(ˆ x)/ˆ x (Proposition 4). In addition, β has an additional direct
negative eﬀect on the ratio. The overall eﬀect is, in general, ambiguous.
In section 4, we present empirical tests of Propositions 3, 4, and 5, and Corollary 1.
These tests exploit variation in the location of aﬃliates of U.S. multinational ﬁrms and
analyze the eﬀect of investor protections on proxies for ˆ x, ˆ φI,a n d ˆ F/ˆ x.18 We identify
the inventor in the model as being a parent ﬁrm and control for other parameters of the
18Although we have developed our model in a two-country setup, we show in the Appendix that
Propositions 3, 4, and 5 continue to apply in a multi-country version of the model in which the statements
not only apply to changes in the parameter γ, but also to cross-sectional variation in investor protections.
18model, such as the shadow value of cash β,t h ec o n c a v i t yo fR(x), the monitoring function
δ(C) and the probabilities pH and pL by using ﬁxed eﬀects for each parent in each year
and controlling for a wide range of host-country variables.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical work presented in section 4 is based on the most comprehensive available
data on the activities of American multinational ﬁrms. The Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) annual survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad from 1982 through 1999 provides
a panel of data on the ﬁnancial and operating characteristics of U.S. ﬁrms operating
abroad.19 U.S. direct investment abroad is deﬁned as the direct or indirect ownership or
control by a single U.S. legal entity of at least ten percent of the voting securities of an
incorporated foreign business enterprise or the equivalent interest in an unincorporated
foreign business enterprise. A U.S. multinational entity is the combination of a single
U.S. legal entity that has made the direct investment, called the U.S. parent, and at
least one foreign business enterprise, called the foreign aﬃliate. The survey covers all
countries and industries, classifying aﬃliates into industries that are roughly equivalent
to three digit SIC code industries. As a result of conﬁdentiality assurances and penalties
for noncompliance, BEA believes that coverage is close to complete and levels of accuracy
are high.
The foreign aﬃliate survey forms that U.S. multinational enterprises are required to
complete vary depending on the year, the size of the aﬃliate, and the U.S. parent’s
percentage of ownership of an aﬃliate. The most extensive data for the period examined
in this study are available for 1982, 1989, 1994, and 1999 when BEA conducted Benchmark
Surveys. In non-benchmark years, exemption levels were higher and less information was
collected.20 Accordingly, the analysis is restricted to benchmark years except when the
annual frequency of the data is critical — in the analysis of scale in section 4.3 that uses
the liberalizations of ownership restrictions.
In order to analyze arm’s length licensing activity, measures of royalty payments and
licensing fees received by U.S. MNC parents from unaﬃliated foreign persons are drawn
from the results of BEA’s annual BE-93 survey. Because these data have been collected
19Coverage and methods of the BEA survey are described in Desai, Foley and Hines (2002).
20For 1982, 1989 and 1994, all aﬃliates with sales, assets or net income in excess of $3 million in
absolute value and their parents were required to ﬁle extensive reports; in 1999, the exemption limit
increased to $7 million. From 1983 to 1988, data on aﬃliates with sales, assets, or net income greater
than $10 million were collected, and this cutoﬀ rose to $15 million for 1990-1993 and $20 million for
1995-1999.
19since 1986, data used in the analysis of licensing activity cover only 1989, 1994, and
1999. Table I provides descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the analysis and
distinguishes between the variables used in analysis employing the benchmark year data
(Panel A) and analysis employing the full panel (Panel B).
Implementing empirical tests of the model requires mapping the variables of the model
to reasonable measurements in the data. Corollary 1 addresses the choice of an inventor
to deploy technology through an arm’s length licensing agreement or through an entity in
which it holds a substantial ownership stake. In order to study this choice empirically, the
analysis uses a dummy variable that is deﬁned at the country/year level. This dummy
is equal to one if the parent receives an arm’s length royalty payment, and it is equal
to zero if the parent only serves the country through aﬃliate activity in a particular
year. Proposition 5 makes predictions concerning the share of inventor ﬁnancing in total
ﬁnancing ( ˆ F/ˆ x). In the data, this variable is deﬁned as the share of aﬃliate assets
ﬁnanced by the multinational parent. Speciﬁcally, this share is the ratio of the sum of
parent provided equity and net borrowing by aﬃliates from the parent to aﬃliate assets.21
Proposition 3 considers the determinants of the share of equity held by the inventor, and
this variable, φI, is measured in the data as the share of aﬃliate equity owned by the
multinational parent. Indicators of the scale of aﬃliate activity are required to test
Proposition 4, and the log of aﬃliate sales is used for this purpose.
Table I also provides descriptive statistics for a number of other variables. Two mea-
sures of investor protections and capital market development are used in the analysis
below. As the model emphasizes the decisions of local lenders, the ﬁrst measure is cred-
itor rights. This measure is drawn from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (forthcoming),
which extends the sample studied in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998) to cover a broader sample of countries over the 1982-1999 period on an annual
basis. Creditor rights is an index taking values between 0 and 4 and measures the extent
of legal protections given to creditors. The second measure of the ability to access local
lenders is the annual ratio of private credit provided by deposit money banks and other
ﬁnancial institutions to GDP, and it is drawn from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine
(1999).22
21In the model, we have interpreted all sources of ﬁnancing as equity ﬁnancing, but as explained in
footnote 13, our setup is not rich enough to distinguish equity ﬁnancing from debt ﬁnancing. Hence, our
empirical tests of Proposition 5 include both.
22It is possible to employ a measure of shareholder rights to measure investor protections. Creditor
rights and private credit are used to measure investor protections for several reasons. First, shareholder
rights are only available for a single year near the end of our sample. Second, in our data, there is
very little local ownership of aﬃliate equity, but aﬃliates do make extensive use of debt borrowed from
20Since credit market development may be correlated with other measures of economic
and institutional development, additional controls for other institutional characteristics
are also employed. A number of countries impose restrictions on the extent to which
foreign ﬁrms can own local ones. Shatz (2000) documents these restrictions using two
distinct measures that capture restrictions on greenﬁeld FDI and cross-border mergers
and acquisition activity. The FDI ownership restriction dummy used below is equal to
one if either of these measures is below three and zero otherwise. Workforce schooling
measures the average schooling years in the population over 25 years old, and this variable
is provided in Barro and Lee (2000). Data on the log of GDP and the log of GDP per
capita, measures of a country’s size and overall level of development, come from the World
Development Indicators. Corporate tax rates are imputed from the BEA data by taking
the median tax rate paid by aﬃliates in a particular country and year.23 Ginarte and Park
(1997) provide a measure of the strength of patent protections, and the Index of Economic
Freedom provides a measure of more general property rights. The International Country
Risk Guide is the source of two other measures of institutional development. Rule of law
is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of a country’s legal system, and Risk
of Expropriation is an index of the risk of outright conﬁscation or forced nationalization
faced by foreign investors. For these measures, higher values indicate a stronger rule of
law and lower risks.
Since the BEA data are a panel of aﬃliate level data, they allow for the inclusion
of parent-year ﬁxed eﬀects. These ﬁxed eﬀects help control for other parameters of the
m o d e lt h a ta r el i k e l yt ob es p e c i ﬁc to particular ﬁrms at particular points in time, such
as the shadow value of cash β, the concavity of R(x), the monitoring function δ(C) and
the probabilities pH and pL. The inclusion of these ﬁxed eﬀects imply that the eﬀects
of investor protections are identiﬁed oﬀ of within ﬁrm variation in the characteristics of
countries in which the ﬁrm is active.
While such an empirical setting does oﬀer a number of advantages, it is worth noting
two shortcomings. First, the sample only includes multinational ﬁrms; ﬁrms that only
deploy technology abroad through licensing are not in our data. If there are a large number
of these ﬁrms that are active in countries with either weak or strong investor protections,
our results would be biased and our approach of identifying eﬀects oﬀ of within ﬁrm
local sources. As such, using creditor rights and private credit allows us to capitalize on some time series
variation in investor protections and more closely corresponds empirically to the ﬁnancing choices of
aﬃliates.
23Aﬃliates with negative net income are excluded for the purposes of calculating country tax rates.
21variation would be misleading because of selection bias.24 Second, the model does not
consider cases in which a ﬁrm neither invests nor licenses technology in a particular
location. As a consequence, we do not consider these cases empirically although there
could be valuable information in them.
4 Empirical Results
The predictions on the use of licensing as opposed to foreign investment and the ﬁnancing
and ownership of foreign aﬃliates are considered ﬁrst by pooling cross-sections from the
benchmark years. These regressions employ a variety of controls for country, parent and
aﬃliate characteristics that test the robustness of the explanatory power of our measures
of the quality of capital markets. Investigating the eﬀect on scale requires an alternative
setup as controlling for the many unobservable characteristics that might determine ﬁrm
size is problematic. Fortunately, the model provides a stark prediction with respect to
scale that can be tested by analyzing within-aﬃliate and within-country responses to the
easing of ownership restrictions.
4.1 Licensing and Aﬃliate Activity
The tests presented in Table II examine the prediction that inventors need not take large
ownership stakes in foreign ﬁrms exploiting their technology if they operate in countries
with high levels of investor protection. The dependent variable in these tests, the Arm’s
Length Licensing Dummy, is deﬁned for country/year pairs in which a parent has an
aﬃliate or from which a parent receives a royalty payment from an unaﬃliated foreign
person. This dummy is equal to one if the parent receives a royalty payment from an
unaﬃliated foreign person, and it is otherwise equal to zero.
Several controls are employed in these regressions in order to isolate the eﬀect of the
quality of capital markets on patterns of activity. All speciﬁcations presented in the table
i n c l u d eam e a s u r eo ft h ee x i s t e n c eo ff o r e i g nownership restrictions. Measures of credit
market development may simply reﬂect other factors related to economic development so
speciﬁcations include workforce schooling and the log of GDP per capita. Larger markets
may be more likely to attract both foreign investment and licensing activity so the log
of GDP is used to control for market size. Host country tax rates can also inﬂuence
the desirability of foreign ownership so host country tax rates are also included in all
24Aggregate 1994 BEA estimates indicate that U.S. multinational parents received 89.8% of royalty
payments and licensing fees received by U.S. ﬁrms, so this concern is unlikely to create signiﬁcant bias.
22speciﬁcations. Additionally, the inclusion of parent-year ﬁxed eﬀects controls for a variety
of unobservable ﬁrm characteristics that might otherwise conﬂate the analysis. Standard
errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent and are clustered at the country/year level. The
speciﬁcations presented in Table II are linear probability models. These are used in order
to incorporate parent/year ﬁxed eﬀects and simultaneously to correct standard errors for
clustering at the country/year level.25
The coeﬃc i e n to nc r e d i t o rr i g h t si nc o l u m n1i sp o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant, indicating that
multinationals are more likely to serve countries with higher levels of ﬁnancial development
through licensing as opposed to only through a foreign aﬃliate. This result is consistent
with the prediction in Corollary 1 of the model. The results also indicate that parents
are more likely to engage in arm’s length licensing as opposed to just aﬃliate activity
in countries that have a more educated workforce, that are larger, and that have higher
corporate tax rates.
The predictions of the model relate to credit market development, but the measure of
creditor rights may be correlated with more general variation in the institutional environ-
ment. The speciﬁcation presented in column 2 includes additional proxies for the quality
of other host country institutions. Speciﬁcally, the analysis includes indices of patent
protctions, property rights, the strength and impartiality of the overall legal system, and
the risk of expropriation as control variables. The coeﬃcient on creditor rights is little
changed by the inclusion of these additional controls, and it implies that capital market
conditions play an economically signiﬁcant role relative to other host country institutions.
The eﬀect of a one standard deviation change in creditor rights is approximately one and
a half times as large as the eﬀect of a one standard deviation change in patent protections,
which is also positive and signiﬁcant in explaining the use of arm’s length licensing.
The speciﬁcation presented in column 3 provides a more subtle test of the model
and the particular mechanism that gives rise to FDI as opposed to licensing. In the
model described in section 2, MNCs are assumed to have a comparative advantage in
monitoring local entrepreneurs because of their familiarity with their technology. The
relative value of MNC monitoring should be more pronounced for ﬁrms that conduct more
research and development (R&D) because these ﬁrms are more likely to be deploying novel
25Given the limited time dimension of our dataset, our linear speciﬁcation avoids the incidental para-
meter problem inherent in the estimation of a large number of ﬁxed eﬀects. As a robustness check, these
speciﬁcations have been run as conditional logit speciﬁcations. The resulting coeﬃcients on the measures
of ﬁnancial development and these measures interacted with the log of parent R&D are of the same sign
and statistical signiﬁcance as those presented in the table, except for the interaction of creditor rights
and the log of parent R&D. The coeﬃcient on this variable is positive, but it is not statistically diﬀerent
from zero at conventional levels.
23technologies that require the unique monitoring ability of multinational parents. More
crudely, multinational ﬁrms with limited technological capabilities are less likely to be
important to external funders as monitors, and the eﬀects of capital market development
on the choice to serve a country through licensing or aﬃliate activity should be less
pronounced for these kinds of ﬁrms.
To test for this diﬀerential eﬀect, the speciﬁcation presented in Column 3 uses the log
of parent R&D as a proxy for the degree to which ﬁrms are technologically advanced. Since
this speciﬁcation includes parent-year ﬁxed eﬀects, this variable does not enter on its own,
but it is interacted with creditor rights. The positive coeﬃcient on the interaction term
is consistent with the prediction that the value of creating incentives to monitor through
ownership in countries with weak ﬁnancial development is highest for technologically
advanced ﬁrms.
The speciﬁcations presented in columns 4-6 of Table II repeat those presented in
columns 1-3 replacing creditor rights with private credit as a measure of ﬁnancial devel-
opment. The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on private credit in columns 4 and 5 are
consistent with the ﬁndings in columns 1 and 2 and illustrate that countries with higher
levels of ﬁnancial development are more likely to be served through unaﬃliated party
licensing as opposed to just aﬃliate activity. The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on
private credit interacted with the log of parent R&D presented in column 6 indicates that
the eﬀects of capital markets on the licensing decision are most pronounced for ﬁrms that
are R&D intensive.
4.2 The Financing and Ownership of Foreign Aﬃliates
The speciﬁcations presented in Table III investigate if aﬃliates located in countries with
poorly functioning credit markets are ﬁnanced more extensively with capital provided by
the parent. Since the ability to monitor is associated with the ﬁrm’s use of technology,
this eﬀect of capital market development should be most pronounced for ﬁrms that are
R&D intensive. The dependent variable employed is the ratio of the sum of net borrowing
from the parent and parent equity provisions (including both paid-in-capital and retained
earnings) to aﬃliate assets.
The speciﬁcation presented in column 1 of Table III includes ownership restrictions to
control for laws that might limit the ability of a parent to provide capital to its aﬃliate
and the corporate tax rate to control for incentives to use debt and to repatriate earnings
created by tax considerations. It also includes the log of GDP, the log of GDP per
capita, and workforce schooling to control for the size of the host country market and
24some measures of the level of host country economic development. The negative and
signiﬁcant coeﬃc i e n to nc r e d i t o rr i g h t si nc o l u m n1i n d i c a t e st h a tt h es h a r eo fa ﬃliate
assets ﬁnanced by the parent is higher in countries that do not provide creditors with
extensive legal protections. This result is consistent with the prediction contained in
Proposition 5.
The speciﬁcation in column 2 includes the set of other institutional variables used
in Table II to ensure that proxies for ﬁnancial development are not proxying for some
other kind of institutional development. In addition, this speciﬁcation also controls for
aﬃliate characteristics that the corporate ﬁnance literature suggests might inﬂuence the
availability of external capital. Harris and Raviv (1991) and Rajan and Zingales (1995)
ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms and ﬁrms with higher levels of tangible assets are more able to
obtain external debt. Two proxies for aﬃl i a t es i z e – t h el o go fa ﬃliate sales and the log
of aﬃliate employment–and a proxy for the tangibility of aﬃliate assets–the ratio of
aﬃliate net property, plant and equipment to aﬃliate assets–are included.
In the speciﬁcation in column 2, the -0.0164 coeﬃcient on creditor rights implies that
the share of aﬃliate assets ﬁnanced by the aﬃliate’s parent is 0.0327, or 7.9% of its mean
value, higher for aﬃliates in countries in the 25th percentile of creditor rights relative
to the 75th percentile of creditor rights. The negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on FDI
ownership restrictions is consistent with the hypothesis that such restrictions limit parent
capital provisions, and the negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the log of GDP suggests
that aﬃliates located in smaller markets are more reliant on their parents for capital.
When aﬃliates borrow, they primarily borrow from external sources, and Desai, Foley
and Hines (2004b) shows that aﬃliates borrow more in high tax jurisdictions. These
facts could explain the negative coeﬃcient on the corporate tax rate in explaining the
share of assets ﬁnanced by the parent.26 Previous theoretical work stressing how concerns
over technology expropriation might give rise to multinational activity does not make
clear predictions concerning the share of aﬃliate assets ﬁnanced by the parent, but it is
worth noting that the indices of patent protection and property rights are negative in the
speciﬁcation in column 2. None of the unreported coeﬃcients on aﬃliate characteristics
are signiﬁcant.
If parent ﬁnancing creates incentives for monitoring and the eﬀects of monitoring are
strongest for ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et e c h n o l o g y ,t h e nt h ee ﬀects documented in column 2 should
be most pronounced for R&D intensive ﬁrms. The speciﬁcation in column 3 tests for
26The model’s predictions relate to overall parent capital provision. As such, these speciﬁcations diﬀer
from the analysis in Desai, Foley and Hines (2004b) where only borrowing decisions are analyzed.
25ad i ﬀerential eﬀect of creditor rights on ﬁnancing by including creditor rights interacted
with the log of parent R&D. The negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on this interaction
term indicates that more technologically advanced ﬁrms ﬁnance a higher share of aﬃliate
assets in countries with weak credit markets. This ﬁnding is not implied by many other
intuitions for why capital market development might aﬀect parental ﬁnancing provisions.
The speciﬁcations presented in columns 4-6 of Table III repeat the analysis presented
in columns 1-3 substituting measures of private credit for creditor rights. In columns 4
and 5, the coeﬃcient on private credit is negative, and it is signiﬁcant in column 4 but
only marginally signiﬁcant in column 5. In the speciﬁcation in column 6, the interaction
of private credit and the log of parent R&D is signiﬁcant. The results obtained when
using private credit are therefore also consistent with the prediction of Proposition 5
and provide further evidence that the eﬀects of credit market conditions are especially
pronounced for technologically advanced ﬁrms.
The model also predicts that multinational parents should hold larger ownership stakes
in aﬃliates located in countries with weak investor protections. Table IV presents results
of using the share of aﬃliate equity owned by the parent as the dependent variable in
speciﬁcations that are similar to those presented in Table III. Although parent equity
shares are bounded between 0 and 1, and there is a large grouping of aﬃliates with equity
that is 100% owned by a single parent ﬁrm, the speciﬁcations presented in Table IV
are ordinary least squares models that include parent/year ﬁxed eﬀects and that allow
standard errors to be clustered at the country/year level.27 In the speciﬁcations presented
in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5, the proxy for credit market development is negative and
signiﬁcant. Parent companies own higher shares of aﬃliate equity when aﬃliates are
located in countries where protections extended to creditors are weaker and private credit
is scarcer, as predicted by the model. In the speciﬁcations presented in columns 3 and
6, the negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the interaction terms indicate that these
results are also more pronounced for technologically advanced ﬁrms.
The results in Table IV also indicate that equity ownership shares are lower in coun-
tries with ownership restrictions, countries that are bigger, countries that are less well-
developed, and countries with higher corporate tax rates. If equity ownership decisions
placed strong emphasis on the protection of technology and ownership substituted for
weak patent protections, the coeﬃcient on the Patent Protections variable should be neg-
ative and signiﬁcant. While the estimated coeﬃcient is negative, it is only marginally
27These results are robust to using an alternative estimation technique. Conditional logit speciﬁcations
that use a dependent variable that is equal to one for wholly owned aﬃliates and zero for partially owned
aﬃliates yield similar results.
26signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations.
The results presented in Tables II, III, and IV are robust to a number of concerns.
First, the estimates of coeﬃcients on capital market conditions interacted with the log
of parent R&D may reﬂect the eﬀect of similar interactions with alternative institutional
variables. Speciﬁcally, the results on these interaction terms may reﬂect an alternative
eﬀect better captured by interacting log of parent R&D with the measure of country
protection of intellectual property. When the log of parent R&D interacted with the
patent protection index is included in the speciﬁcations presented in columns 3 and 6 of
the three tables, the interactions featuring proxies for credit market development remain
signiﬁcant in all of the tests except for the one in column 3 of Table II. It may also be
t h ec a s et h a tt h es h a r eo fa ﬃliate assets ﬁnanced by the parent and parent ownership
levels are lower for older aﬃliates and these aﬃliates may be more likely to be located
in countries with well developed credit markets. Including proxies for aﬃliate age in the
speciﬁcations presented in the speciﬁc a t i o n sp r e s e n t e di nT a b l e sI I Ia n dI Vd o e sn o ta ﬀect
the results of interest.28
4.3 The Scale of Multinational Activity
The model predicts that multinational activity will be greatest in countries with stronger
investor protections. Because there are many theories for the determinants of FDI activity,
using speciﬁcations similar to those presented in Tables II, III, and IV to explore scale is
problematic.29 It is diﬃcult to include a set of controls suﬃciently extensive to distinguish
between alternative theories.
Given this diﬃculty, the analysis below investigates a subtler and more precise pre-
diction of the model by investigating the role of liberalizations of ownership restrictions
on the scale of multinational ﬁrm activity. Speciﬁcally, the model suggests that the re-
sponse to ownership liberalizations should be larger in host countries with weak investor
protections. The intuition for this prediction is that in countries with weak investor pro-
tections, ownership restrictions are more likely to bind because ownership is most critical
for maximizing the value of the enterprise in these settings. As such, the relaxation of
an ownership constraint should have muted eﬀects for aﬃliates in countries with deep
28The proxies for age are the number of years since an aﬃliate ﬁrst reported data to BEA and a dummy
equal to one if the aﬃliate ﬁrst reported in 1982 and zero otherwise.
29Appendix Table I presents the results of such an exercise. Although the coeﬃcients on both the
creditor rights variables and private credit variables are usually positive in explaining the log of aﬃliate
sales in the speciﬁcations presented in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5, as Proposition 3 predicts, none of the
coeﬃcients on these variables is signiﬁcant.
27capital markets and more pronounced eﬀects for aﬃliates in countries with weaker capital
markets.
The speciﬁcations presented in Table V investigate if such diﬀerential eﬀects are indeed
present. Liberalizations are deﬁned as the ﬁrst year in which the FDI ownership restriction
dummy described above changes from 1 to 0.30 The dependent variable in columns 1
and 2 is the log value of aﬃliate sales, and the sample consists of the full panel from
1982 to 1999. Given the limited data requirements of these speciﬁcations (relative to
the variables investigated in Tables II, III and IV) and the desire to investigate changes
within aﬃliates, the full panel provides a more appropriate setting for these tests. These
speciﬁcations include aﬃliate and year ﬁxed eﬀects and the standard errors are clustered
a tt h ec o u n t r yl e v e l .T h es a m p l ei n c l u d e sa l lc o u n t r i e ss oa ﬃliate activity in countries that
do not liberalize helps identify the year eﬀects and the coeﬃcients on the income variables,
but the results are robust to using a sample drawn only from reforming countries.
The speciﬁcations in columns 1 and 2 include controls for log GDP, log GDP per
capita and the post-liberalization dummy. The coeﬃcient on log GDP per capita is
positive and signiﬁcant indicating that rising incomes are associated with larger levels of
aﬃliate activity. The coeﬃcient of interest in column 1 is the coeﬃcient on the interaction
of the post-liberalization dummy and a dummy that is equal to one if the country is at
or below the median value of the creditor rights index in the year of liberalization. The
positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient indicates that aﬃliates in weak creditor rights countries
grow quickly after liberalizations. The coeﬃcient on the post-liberalization dummy on its
own indicates that the eﬀect of liberalizations is negligible and statistically insigniﬁcant
for aﬃliates in high creditor rights countries. In column 2, these same results are obtained
when the measure of private credit is used as the proxy for ﬁnancial development. At the
aﬃliate level, the model’s predictions regarding how the scale of activity relates to capital
market depth are validated using tests that, through the use of aﬃliate ﬁxed eﬀects and
the emphasis on the interaction term, are diﬃcult to reconcile with alternative theories.
It is possible that the results presented in columns 1 and 2 inaccurately capture the
eﬀects of the liberalizations because they only measure activity on the intensive margin
30The countries experiencing a liberalization are Argentina (1990), Australia (1987), Colombia (1992),
Ecuador (1991), Finland (1990), Honduras (1993), Japan (1993), Malaysia (1987), Mexico (1990), Norway
(1995), Peru (1992), Philippines (1992), Portugal (1987), Sweden (1992), Trinidad and Tobago (1994),
and Venezuela (1990). Since control variables measuring the development of institutions other than
credit markets do not vary much (if at all) through time and are unavailable for six of the sixteen
reforming countries, these controls are not included in the analysis of liberalizations. The aﬃliate ﬁxed
eﬀects implicitly control for time invariant country characteristics so this is unlike to pose a signiﬁcant
problem.
28and fail to capture responses on the extensive margin. For example, entry or exit might
accompany liberalizations and might amplify or dampen these results. In order to consider
this possibility, the speciﬁcations provided in columns 3 and 4 employ a dependent variable
that is the log value of the aggregate value of all sales of U.S. multinational aﬃliates within
a country-year cell. These speciﬁcations substitute country ﬁxed eﬀects for aﬃliate ﬁxed
eﬀects but are otherwise similar to the regressions provided in columns 1 and 2.
In column 3, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term including the creditor rights vari-
able is again positive and signiﬁcant indicating that including activity on the extensive
margin does not appear to contradict the earlier result. In column 4, the coeﬃcient on
the interaction term is again positive and signiﬁcant. Taken together, the results suggest
that the scale of activity is positively related to the quality of investor protections and
capital market development, and these results persist when incorporating the eﬀects of
entry and exit.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Eﬀorts to understand patterns of multinational ﬁrm activity have typically emphasized
aspects of technology transfer rather than the constraints imposed by weak investor pro-
tections and shallow capital markets. In the prior literature, multinational ﬁrms arise
because of the risk of a partner expropriating a proprietary technology. In the model
presented in this paper, the exploitation of technology is central to understanding multi-
national ﬁrm activity but the critical constraint is the nature of capital market develop-
ment and investor protections in host countries. Entrepreneurs must raise capital to fund
projects, and external investors are aware of the possibility that these entrepreneurs might
behave opportunistically. Inventors can alleviate ﬁnancial frictions because they have a
comparative advantage in monitoring entrepreneurs. Multinational activity and capital
ﬂows arise endogenously to ensure that monitoring occurs. External investors demand
higher levels of multinational parent ﬁrm ﬁnancial participation in countries with weak
investor protections.
By placing ﬁnancial frictions at the center of understanding patterns of activity and
ﬂows, the model delivers novel predictions about the use of arm’s length licensing and
about the ﬁnancial and investment decisions of multinational ﬁrms that are validated
in ﬁrm-level analysis. The use of arm’s length licensing to deploy technology is more
common in countries with strong investor protections and deep capital markets. Previous
ﬁndings that FDI ﬂows to developing countries are limited reﬂect two opposing forces.
29Weak investor protections and shallow capital markets limit the eﬃcient scale of enterprise
but also result in greater parent provision of capital and more ownership of the aﬃliate
equity. The eﬀects of the institutional setting are more prounced for R&D intensive ﬁrms
as parental monitoring is particularly valuable for the investments of these ﬁrms. By
jointly considering operational and ﬁnancial decisions, the theory and empirics provide
an integrated explanation for patterns of MNC activity and FDI ﬂows that have typically
been considered separately.
Further consideration of the role of ﬁnancial frictions on multinational ﬁrm activity
along several dimensions may prove fruitful. First, the model presented eﬀectively rules
out exports to unrelated parties as a means of serving foreign markets. Incorporating
the tradeoﬀ between exports and production abroad in a world with ﬁnancial frictions
may yield additional predictions that would help explain the choice between exporting
and FDI. Second, exploring the implications of ﬁnancial frictions for intraﬁrm trade may
help explain how the demands of external funders in weak institutional environments
aﬀect the fragmentation of production processes across borders. Finally, given the central
role of foreign ownership in reducing diversion, it may be interesting to consider how
industrial activity in weaker institutional environments is distributed between local ﬁrms
and multinational aﬃliates and how these types of ﬁrms compete.
30A Appendix
A.1 The Shadow Cost of Cash
In the main text, we have treated the shadow value of cash β as exogenous. In this Ap-
pendix we brieﬂy illustrate how to endogenize it and show how it relates to characteristics
of the Home country and in particular to its level of investor protection.
For this purpose, we generalize the setup described in section 2.1 and consider the
s i t u a t i o ni nw h i c ht h e r ea r eJ − 1 Foreign countries, each associated with a level of
ﬁnancial development γj and a cash ﬂow function Rj (xj).31 The inventor contracts with
each of J − 1 foreign entrepreneurs and, as a result of the optimal contracting described
above, has an amount of cash equal to W +
P
j6=H ˆ Pj to invest in the Home country.
Preferences and technology at Home are such that the cash ﬂows obtained from the
sale of the diﬀerentiated good at Home can be expressed as a strictly increasing and
concave function of the quantity produced, RH (q), satisfying the same properties as the
cash ﬂow function in other countries. Home production is managed by the inventor, who
can also privately choose to behave or misbehave, with consequences identical to those
discussed above: if the inventor behaves, the project performs with probability pH,b u t
if he misbehaves, the project performs with a lower probability pL. In the latter case,
however, the inventor obtains a private beneﬁte q u a lt oaf r a c t i o n1 − γH of cash ﬂows,
where γH is an index of investor protection at Home.
The inventor sells domestic cash ﬂow rights to a continuum of external investors at
Home, who can obtain a rate of return equal to one in an alternative investment oppor-
tunity.32 We consider an optimal ﬁnancial contract between the inventor and external
investors in which the inventor is granted the ability to make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers,
just as in the main text. The optimal contract speciﬁes the scale of operation xH,t h e
amount of cash Wx that the inventor invests in the project, the share of equity φ
H
E sold
to external investors, and the amount of cash EH provided by external investors.
Taking the contracts signed with foreign individuals as given, an optimal ﬁnancial
contract with external investors at Home that induces the inventor to behave is given by
the tuple
n




that solves the following program:
31With some abuse of notation we use J to denote both the number o fc o u n t r i e sa sw e l la st h eset of
these countries.





















j6=H Pj − Wx
s.t. xH ≤ EH + Wx






















It is straightforward to show that provided that γH is low enough (i.e, provided that
ﬁnancial frictions at Home are large enough), all constraints in program (P3) will bind in





























1 − ˆ xH
pHRH(ˆ xH)
´ > 1.( 1 6 )
Notice that the resulting proﬁt function (15) is closely related to that considered in pro-
gram (P3) in section 2.3, where ˆ β now replaces β. There are however two important
diﬀerences between the two proﬁt functions.
First, the formulation in (15) considers the case in which the inventor obtains cash
ﬂow from the exploitation of the technology in multiple countries. Nevertheless, notice
that for a given ˆ β, the proﬁt function features separability between these diﬀerent sources
of dividends. As a result, for a given ˆ β, the optimal contract with the entrepreneur and
external investors in each country j is as described in section 2.3.33 Hence, Propositions
3, 4, and 5 continue to apply and their statements not only apply to changes in the
parameter γ, but also to cross-sectional (cross-country) variation in investor protection.
In this sense, the tests performed in section 4 are well deﬁned.
The second important diﬀerence between the proﬁt function in (15) and in program
(P3) is that the shadow value of cash ˆ β is in fact endogenous, in the sense that it is a
function of the scale of operation at Home xH, which in turn will depend on the optimal
33Notice also that when ˆ β>1, the inventor is ﬁnancially constrained at Home, in the sense that external
investors at Home are only willing to lend to him a multiple of his pleadgeable income (wealth plus date-
0 payments). If external investors were to lend a larger amount, the inventor’s incentive compatibility
constraint would be violated. The same would of course apply to external investors in foreign countries.
This helps rationalize our assumption in section 2.1 that the inventor does not sign bilateral ﬁnancial
contracts with external investors in host countries.
32contracts in the other J countries through the date-0 transfers ˆ Pj for j 6= H (as is clear
from program (P3)). Hence, ˆ β will in general be a function of the vector of country
investor protections γ ≡
¡
γ1,...,γJ−1,γH¢
. Notice, however, that for large enough J,t h e
eﬀect of a particular investor protection level γj (j 6= H) on the overall shadow value of
cash ˆ β will tend to be negligible, and thus the comparative static results in section 2.4
will continue to apply.
To sum up, this Appendix has illustrated that a higher-than-one shadow value of cash
can easily be rationalized in a simple extension of our initial partial-equilibrium model,
in which not only foreign entrepreneurs, but also the inventor faces ﬁnancial constraints.
We have seen that endogenizing the shadow value of cash may aﬀect the solution of the
optimal contract in subtle ways, but that if the number of host countries in which the
inventor exploits his technology is large enough, the comparative static results in section
2.4 remain qualitatively valid.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us start by writing the Lagrangian corresponding to program (P1). Letting λk de-
note the multiplier corresponding to correspond to constraint k =1 ,2,4,5 (remember
constraint (iii) cannot bind), we have
L = φIpHR(x)+( W + P)β − CR(x)+λ1 (E − P − x)+λ2 (pHφER(x) − E)
+λ4 ((pH − pL)(1− φE − φI)R(x) − (1 − γ)δ(C)R(x)) + λ5φI.




= β − λ1 =0
∂L
∂φI




0 (˜ x) − ˜ CR






1 − ˜ φE − ˜ φI
´





0 (˜ x)=0 (A1)
∂L
∂φE
= λ2pHR(˜ x) − λ4 (pH − pL)R(˜ x)=0
33∂L
∂E
= λ1 − λ2 =0
∂L
∂C





R(˜ x)=0 . (A2)
Straightforward manipulation of these conditions delivers








λ5 =( β − 1)pHR(˜ x) > 0,
from which we conclude that all constraints bind, as claimed in the main text.






















These correspond to equations (3) and (4) in the main text. The comparative statics
related to ˜ C follow directly from the convexity of δ(·). As for the comparative statics



































































Hence, R0 (˜ x) falls in γ and β,a n dt h u s˜ x increases in these two parameters.
A.3 Optimal Contract Implementing Bad Behavior
It is clear that in this case the inventor has no incentive to exert monitoring eﬀort. It is
also immediate that even when the entrepreneur does not obtain any share of the cash
34ﬂows, her participation constraint will be satisﬁed, and thus we have that ˜ φ
L
I + ˜ φ
L
E =1 .
The program can then be written as
max
P,φI,x,E
ΠI = φIpLR(x)+( W + P)β
s.t. x ≤ E − P (i)
pL(1 − φI)R(x) ≥ E (ii)
φI ≥ 0 (iii)
(P1L)
The corresponding Lagrangian is
L = φIpLR(x)+( W + P)β + λ1 (E − P − x)+λ2 (pL (1 − φI)R(x) − E)+λ3φI.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
∂L
∂P
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= λ1 − λ2 =0
Note that
λ1 = λ2 = β





Hence, all constraints bind, which implies ˜ φ
L
I =0 . Plugging the values of the multipliers,
as well as ˜ CL = ˜ φ
L






which corresponds to equation (8) in the main text. Note also that plugging the con-
straints in the objective function delivers:
˜ Π










as claimed in the main text.












R0(x) − x is strictly increasing in x whenever R00 (x) < 0, we can conclude that
good behavior will be implemented whenever
˜ x>˜ x
L.
Note also that ˜ x is increasing in γ,w h i l e˜ xL is independent of γ. Furthermore, when
γ → 1, it is necessarily the case that ˜ x>˜ xL. Hence, there exists a threshold γ over which
it is optimal to implement good behavior.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us start by writing the Lagrangian corresponding to program (P2). Letting λk de-
note the multiplier corresponding to correspond to constraint k =1 ,2,4,5 (remember
constraint (iii) cannot bind), we can write this as:
L = φIpHR(x)+( W + P)β − CR(x)+λ1 (E − P − x)+λ2 (pHφER(x) − E)







It is then straightforward to see that the same ﬁrst-order conditions as in program (P1)
apply, except for the partial ∂L/∂C, which is now given by
∂L
∂C








=0 .( A 4 )
Straightforward manipulation again delivers from which we conclude that all constraints
bind, as claimed in the main text. Furthermore, we ﬁnd again that








λ5 =( β − 1)pHR(ˆ x) > 0.
36Moreover, constraint (v’) now implies that ˆ φI = ˆ C/(pH − pL). Plugging the values of the










as claimed in equation (10) in the main text. Next, plugging the multipliers and ˆ φI into
















which corresponds to equation (11) in the main text. Setting the constraints to equality,
we can also compute the total payoﬀ obtained by the inventor:







This is analogous to the expression obtained in the case of veriﬁable monitoring, but with
ˆ x replacing ˜ x. Because the constraints in program (P1) are tighter than in program (P2),
we can conclude that ˆ ΠI < ˜ ΠI, which given the monotonicity of
R(x)
R0(x) − x implies that
ˆ x<˜ x.
The expression we have derived for ˆ ΠI c a nb eu s e dt oa n a l y z ew h e ni ti so p t i m a l
for the inventor to implement good behavior. Notice that the optimal contract that
implements bad behavior is not aﬀected by whether monitoring is veriﬁable or not. Hence,
implementing good behavior is optimal whenever ˆ ΠI > ˜ ΠL
I ,o rs i m p l yˆ x>˜ xL. Again, for
suﬃciently high γ, this will necessarily be satisﬁed.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1
This follows from the fact that the right-hand side of equation (10) is increasing in γ and
decreasing in β, while the left-hand is decreasing in ˆ C (given the convexity of δ(·)).


















































































>From inspection of (11) and the concavity of R(·),i ti st h e nc l e a rt h a tˆ x is increasing
in γ and decreasing in β.
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42Mean Standard Deviation
Panel A: Benchmark Year Data for Tests in Tables II-V
Multinational Firm Variables
Arm's Length Licensing Dummy 0.1522 0.3592
Share of Affiliate Assets Financed by Parent 0.4146 0.3267
Share of Affiliate Equity Owned by Parent 0.8991 0.2195
Log of Affiliate Sales 9.9024 1.7218
Log of Affiliate Employment 4.7601 1.6060
Affiliate Net PPE/Assets 0.2355 0.2264
Log of Parent R&D Expenditures 9.0580 4.3927
Country Variables
Creditor Rights 2.1415 1.2100
Private Credit 0.7536 0.3891
FDI Ownership Restrictions 0.2247 0.4174
Workforce Schooling 8.1385 2.1739
Log of GDP 26.8002 1.4252
Log of GDP per Capita 9.3995 1.1019
Corporate Tax Rate 0.3488 0.1060
Patent Protections 3.2287 0.8480
Property Rights 1.6233 0.8378
Rule of Law 9.3207 1.4088
Risk of Expropriation 5.1398 1.2731
Panel B: Annual Data for Tests in Table IV
Log of Affiliate Sales 10.1285 2.1426
Log of Aggregated Affiliate Sales 15.7572 1.7018
Table I
Descriptive Statistics
Notes: Panel A provides descriptive statistics for data drawn from the 1982, 1989, 1994, and 1999 benchmark year survey and used in the analysis 
presented in Tables II-V.  Arm's Length Licensing Dummy is defined for country/year pairs in which a parent has an affiliate or from which a parent 
receives a royalty payment from an unaffiliated foreign person.  This dummy is equal to one  if the parent receives a royalty payment from an 
unaffiliated foreign person, and it is otherwise equal to zero.  Share of Affiliate Assets Financed by Parents is the ratio of parent provided equity and ne
parent lending to total affiliate assets.  Share of Affiliate Equity Ownership is the equity ownership of the multinational parent.  Affiliate Net 
PPE/Assets is the ratio of affiliate net property plant and equipment to affiliate assets.  Creditor Rights is an index of the strength of creditor rights 
developed in Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2005); higher levels of the measure indicate stronger legal protections.  Private Credit is the ratio of 
private credit lent by deposit money banks to GDP, as provided in Beck et. al. (1999).  FDI Ownership Restrictions is a dummy equal to one if two
measures of restrictions on foreign ownership as measured by Shatz (2000) are above 3 on a scale of 1 to 5 and zero otherwise.  Workforce Schooling is 
the average schooling years in the population over 25 years old provided in Barro and Lee (2000).  Corporate Tax Rate is the median effective tax rate 
paid by affiliates in a particular country and year.  Patent Protections is an index of the strength of patent rights provided in Ginarte and Park (1997).  
Property Rights is an index of the strength of property rights drawn from the 1996 Index of Economic Freedom.  Rule of Law is an assessment of the 
strength and impartiality of a country's overall legal system drawn from the International Country Risk Guide.  Risk of Expropriation is an index of the 
risk of outright confiscation or forced nationalization of private enterprise, and it is also drawn from the International Country Risk Guide; higher 
values of this index reflect lower risks.  Panel B provides descriptive statistics for annual data covering the 1982-1999 period that are used in the 
analysis presented in Table IV.  Log of Aggregated Affiliate Sales is the log of affiliate sales summed across affiliates in a particular country and year.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)








FDI Ownership Restrictions 0.0121 0.0080 0.0079 0.0007 0.0028 0.0020
(0.0100) (0.0097) (0.0094) (0.0105) (0.0099) (0.0097)
Workforce Schooling 0.0078 0.0138 0.0134 0.0075 0.0110 0.0103
(0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0025)
Log of GDP 0.0274 0.0274 0.0268 0.0243 0.0249 0.0242
(0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0039)
Log of GDP per Capita -0.0167 -0.0140 -0.0144 -0.0203 -0.0205 -0.0223
(0.0045) (0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0053) (0.0077) (0.0077)
0.1452 0.1830 0.1777 0.1614 0.1602 0.1588
(0.0492) (0.0470) (0.0453) (0.0490) (0.0445) (0.0438)
Patent Protections 0.0142 0.0127 0.0176 0.0158
(0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0065) (0.0066)
Property Rights 0.0253 0.0254 0.0101 0.0086
(0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0065) (0.0066)
Rule of Law -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0037 -0.0040
(0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0046)
Risk of Expropriation -0.0087 -0.0081 -0.0092 -0.0080
(0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0057) (0.0055)
Constant -0.5747 -0.6965 -0.6685 -0.4600 -0.4967 -0.4438
(0.1000) (0.1062) (0.1053) (0.0951) (0.0998) (0.0974)
Parent/Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYY
No. of Obs. 33,004           31,906           30,954           30,678           30,079           29,238          
R-Squared 0.5993 0.6006 0.6062 0.5995 0.6024 0.6105
Table II
Licensing and Affiliate Activity
Arm's Length Licensing Dummy
Creditor Rights*Log of Parent 
R&D
Private Credit*Log of Parent 
R&D
Corporate Tax Rate
Notes: The dependent variable, the Arm's Length Licensing Dummy, is defined for country/year pairs in which a parent has an affiliate or from which a 
parent receives a royalty payment from an unaffiliated foreign person.  This dummy is equal to one  if the parent receives a royalty payment from an 
unaffiliated foreign person, and it is otherwise equal to zero.  Creditor Rights is an index of the strength of creditor rights developed in Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2005); higher levels of the measure indicate stronger legal protections.  Private credit is the ratio of private credit lent by deposit 
money banks to GDP, as provided in Beck et. al. (1999).  FDI Ownership Restrictions is a dummy equal to one if two measures of restrictions on 
foreign ownership as measured by Shatz (2000) are above 3 on a scale of 1 to 5 and zero otherwise.  Workforce Schooling is the average schooling 
years in the population over 25 years old provided in Barro and Lee (2000).  Corporate Tax Rate is the median effective tax rate paid by affiliates in a 
particular country and year.  Patent Protections is an index of the strength of patent rights provided in Ginarte and Park (1997).  Property Rights is an 
index of the strength of property rights drawn from the 1996 Index of Economic Freedom.  Rule of Law is an assessment of the strength and 
impartiality of a country's overall legal system drawn from the International Country Risk Guide.  Risk of Expropriation is an index of the risk of 
outright confiscation or forced nationalization of private enterprise, and it is also drawn from the International Country Risk Guide; higher values of 
this index reflect lower risks.  Each specification is an OLS specification that includes parent-year fixed effects.  Heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors that correct for clustering at the country/year level appear in parentheses.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)








FDI Ownership Restrictions -0.0406 -0.0426 -0.0426 -0.0323 -0.0358 -0.0358
(0.0146) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0171) (0.0160) (0.0162)
Workforce Schooling 0.0200 0.0110 0.0115 0.0199 0.0151 0.0157
(0.0057) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0048) (0.0049)
Log of GDP -0.0224 -0.0179 -0.0180 -0.0157 -0.0148 -0.0148
(0.0055) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0062) (0.0084) (0.0085)
Log of GDP per Capita -0.0327 -0.0066 -0.0073 -0.0285 0.0027 0.0030
(0.0112) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0136) (0.0167) (0.0169)
-0.1288 -0.2135 -0.2061 -0.1135 -0.1803 -0.1732
(0.0777) (0.0763) (0.0764) (0.0743) (0.0742) (0.0745)
Patent Protections -0.0392 -0.0388 -0.0434 -0.0436
(0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0120)
Property Rights -0.0111 -0.0110 0.0097 0.0113
(0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0103) (0.0106)
Rule of Law 0.0058 0.0062 0.0065 0.0068
(0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0080)
Risk of Expropriation 0.0010 0.0007 0.0009 0.0003
(0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0094)
Constant 1.2571 1.0376 1.0386 1.0444 0.7810 0.7653
(0.1083) (0.1511) (0.1527) (0.1479) (0.1701) (0.1735)
Parent/Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYY
Affiliate Controls? NYYNYY
No. of Obs. 51,060           41,232           40,297           48,183           38,911           38,016          
R-Squared 0.3013 0.3105 0.3071 0.3076 0.3167 0.3134
assessment of the strength and impartiality of a country's overall legal system drawn from the International Country Risk Guide.  Risk of Expropriation 
is an index of the risk of outright confiscation or forced nationalization of private enterprise, and it is also drawn from the International Country Risk 
Guide; higher values of this index reflect lower risks.  Each specification is an OLS specification that includes parent-year fixed effects.  As affiliate 
controls, the specifications presented in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 include the log of affiliate sales, the log of affiliate employment, and affiliate net 
PPE/assets.  Affiliate Net PPE/Assets is the ratio of affiliate net property plant and equipment to affiliate assets.  Heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors that correct for clustering at the country/year level appear in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of parent provided equity and net parent lending to total assets.  Creditor Rights is an index of the strength of 
creditor rights developed in Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2005); higher levels of the measure indicate stronger legal protections.  Private credit is 
the ratio of private credit lent by deposit money banks to GDP, as provided in Beck et. al. (1999).  FDI Ownership Restrictions is a dummy equal to one
if two measures of restrictions on foreign ownership as measured by Shatz (2000) are above 3 on a scale of 1 to 5 and zero otherwise.  Workforce 
Schooling is the average schooling years in the population over 25 years old provided in Barro and Lee (2000).  Corporate Tax Rate is the median 
effective tax rate paid by affiliates in a particular country and year.  Patent Protections is an index of the strength of patent rights provided in Ginarte 
and Park (1997).  Property Rights is an index of the strength of property rights drawn from the 1996 Index of Economic Freedom.  Rule of Law is an 
Table III
Parent Financing of Affiliate Activity
Share of Affiliate Assets Financed by Parent
Corporate Tax Rate
Creditor Rights*Log of Parent 
R&D
Private Credit*Log of Parent 
R&DDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)








FDI Ownership Restrictions -0.0728 -0.0637 -0.0611 -0.0622 -0.0560 -0.0529
(0.0126) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0122)
Workforce Schooling 0.0005 -0.0048 -0.0043 0.0007 -0.0030 -0.0026
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Log of GDP -0.0157 -0.0116 -0.0115 -0.0110 -0.0079 -0.0079
(0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0035) (0.0046) (0.0046)
Log of GDP per Capita 0.0309 0.0358 0.0362 0.0381 0.0402 0.0416
(0.0064) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0078) (0.0143) (0.0144)
-0.2634 -0.3456 -0.3391 -0.2778 -0.3249 -0.3179
(0.0638) (0.0712) (0.0701) (0.0584) (0.0582) (0.0564)
Patent Protections -0.0142 -0.0137 -0.0127 -0.0122
(0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0078) (0.0077)
Property Rights -0.0054 -0.0043 0.0001 0.0014
(0.0072) (0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0072)
Rule of Law 0.0005 0.0012 0.0009 0.0017
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0060)
Risk of Expropriation 0.0054 0.0050 0.0069 0.0060
(0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0067)
Constant 1.1592 1.1096 1.0932 0.9832 0.9352 0.9072
(0.1006) (0.1246) (0.1224) (0.0947) (0.1028) (0.0991)
Parent/Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYY
Affiliate Controls? NYYNYY
No. of Obs. 51,320           41,436           40,498           48,422           39,096           38,198          
R-Squared 0.3974 0.4250 0.4184 0.3998 0.4275 0.4217
Table IV
Parent Ownership of Affiliate Equity
Share of Affiliate Equity Owned by Parent
Creditor Rights*Log of Parent 
R&D
Private Credit*Log of Parent 
R&D
Corporate Tax Rate
Notes: The dependent variable is  the share of affiliate equity owned by the affiliate's parent.  Creditor Rights is an index of the strength of creditor 
rights developed in Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2005); higher levels of the measure indicate stronger legal protections.  Private credit is the ratio o
private credit lent by deposit money banks to GDP, as provided in Beck et. al. (1999).  FDI Ownership Restrictions is a dummy equal to one if two 
measures of restrictions on foreign ownership as measured by Shatz (2000) are above 3 on a scale of 1 to 5 and zero otherwise.  Workforce Schooling i
the average schooling years in the population over 25 years old provided in Barro and Lee (2000).  Corporate Tax Rate is the median effective tax rate 
paid by affiliates in a particular country and year.  Patent Protections is an index of the strength of patent rights provided in Ginarte and Park (1997).  
Property Rights is an index of the strength of property rights drawn from the 1996 Index of Economic Freedom.  Rule of Law is an assessment of the 
strength and impartiality of a country's overall legal system drawn from theInternational Country Risk Guide.  Risk of Expropriation is an index of the 
confiscation or forced nationalization of private enterprise, and it is also drawn from the International Country Risk Guide; higher values of this index 
reflect lower risks.  Each specification is an OLS specification that includes parent-year fixed effects.  As affiliate controls, the specifications presented 
in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 include the log of affiliate sales, the log of affiliate employment, and affiliate net PPE/assets.  Affiliate Net PPE/Assets is the 
ratio of affiliate net property plant and equipment to affiliate assets.  Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the 
country/year level appear in parentheses.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post Liberalization Dummy 0.0016 -0.0073 -0.0633 -0.1049





Log of GDP 0.3886 0.3409 -0.0786 -0.1351
(0.3888) (0.3960) (0.7833) (0.7040)
Log of GDP per Capita 1.3675 1.4488 2.6620 2.8376
(0.3720) (0.3867) (0.5425) (0.6192)
Constant -13.5818 -13.0613 -4.7847 -4.9033
(9.2414) (9.2484) (22.1876) (20.0397)
Affiliate and Year Fixed Effects? YY NN
Country and Year Fixed Effects? NN YY
No. of Obs. 180,796           181,103           827                  845                 
R-Squared 0.8035 0.8040 0.9243 0.9251
Table V
Scale of Affiliate Activity
year fixed effects.  Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the country level appear in parentheses. 
Log of Affiliate Sales
Log of Aggregate Affiliate 
Sales
Notes: The dependent variable in the first two columns is the log of affiliate sales, and the dependent variable in the last two columns is 
the log of affiliate sales aggregated across affiliates in a particular country.  The data are annual data covering the 1982-1999 period.  
The Post Liberalization Dummy is equal to one for the sixteen countries that liberalize their ownership restrictions in the year of and 
years following liberalization of foreign ownership restrictions.  The Low Creditor Rights Dummy is equal to one for observations 
related to countries with below median levels of creditor rights among liberalizing countries measured in the year prior to liberalization 
and zero otherwise.  The Low Private Credit Dummy is equal to one for observations related to countries with below median levels of 
private credit among liberalizing countries measured in the year prior to liberalization and zero otherwise.  Private credit is the ratio of 
private credit lent by deposit money banks to GDP, as provided in Beck et. al. (1999).  The first two specifications are OLS 
specifications that include affiliate and year fixed effects, and the last two are OLS specifications that include country and 
Post Liberalization Dummy * Low 
Creditor Rights Dummy
Post Liberalization Dummy * Low 
Private Credit DummyDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)








FDI Ownership Restrictions -0.2030 -0.2874 -0.2837 -0.1850 -0.3054 -0.3039
(0.0562) (0.0609) (0.0612) (0.0640) (0.0707) (0.0708)
Workforce Schooling 0.0270 0.0500 0.0503 0.0305 0.0472 0.0475
(0.0211) (0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0193) (0.0185) (0.0185)
Log of GDP 0.2041 0.3180 0.3198 0.2168 0.3188 0.3207
(0.0338) (0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0303) (0.0241) (0.0242)
Log of GDP per Capita 0.0764 0.0161 0.0081 0.0937 -0.0010 -0.0082
(0.0509) (0.0544) (0.0533) (0.0579) (0.0553) (0.0542)
0.5700 -0.5748 -0.5627 0.5923 -0.6251 -0.6222
(0.4293) (0.3083) (0.3117) (0.4313) (0.3255) (0.3283)
Patent Protections -0.1100 -0.1034 -0.1077 -0.1030
(0.0430) (0.0430) (0.0434) (0.0434)
Property Rights 0.0170 0.0142 0.0078 0.0081
(0.0517) (0.0526) (0.0492) (0.0504)
Rule of Law 0.0224 0.0268 0.0206 0.0250
(0.0322) (0.0320) (0.0333) (0.0332)
Risk of Expropriation 0.0221 0.0203 0.0249 0.0228
(0.0349) (0.0348) (0.0361) (0.0359)
Constant 3.3139 1.0997 1.0512 2.8439 1.2578 1.2018
(0.5632) (0.6058) (0.6151) (0.5503) (0.5850) (0.5885)
Parent/Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYY
No. of Obs. 51,320           41,465           40,527           48,422           39,123           38,225          
R-Squared 0.3349 0.3454 0.3400 0.3365 0.3489 0.3436
nationalization of private enterprise, and it is also drawn from the International Country Risk Guide; higher values of this index reflect lower risks.  
Each specification is an OLS specification that includes parent-year fixed effects.  Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that correct for 
clustering at the country/year level appear in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of affiliate sales.  Creditor Rights is an index of the strength of creditor rights developed in Djankov, McLiesh, 
and Shleifer (2005); higher levels of the measure indicate stronger legal protections.  Private credit is the ratio of private credit lent by deposit money 
banks to GDP, as provided in Beck et. al. (1999).  FDI Ownership Restrictions is a dummy equal to one if two measures of restrictions on foreign 
ownership as measured by Shatz (2000) are above 3 on a scale of 1 to 5 and zero otherwise.  Workforce Schooling is the average schooling years in the 
population over 25 years old provided in Barro and Lee (2000).  Corporate Tax Rate is the median effective tax rate paid by affiliates in a particular 
country and year.  Patent Protections is an index of the strength of patent rights provided in Ginarte and Park (1997).  Property Rights is an index of the
strength of property rights drawn from the 1996 Index of Economic Freedom.  Rule of Law is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of a 
country's overall legal system drawn from the  International Country Risk Guide.  Risk of Expropriation is an index of the risk of outright confiscation o
Appendix Table I
Creditor Rights*Log of Parent 
R&D
Private Credit*Log of Parent 
R&D
Corporate Tax Rate
Scale of Affiliate Activity
Log of Affiliate Sales